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Dinner Parties During “Lost Decades”: On the 
Difficulties of Rethinking Financial Markets, Fostering 
Elite Consensus, and Renewing Political Economy 
David A. Westbrook* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses two groups of problems that ought to be un-
derstood in relation to one another. On the one hand, there is ample rea-
son to be concerned about the economy in the North Atlantic countries. 
On the other hand, and keeping in mind that history is a slaughter bench 
and economics is dismal, one might reasonably worry about how we, in 
societies with “modern” economic and political structures, may go about 
collectively thinking, discussing, and even deciding on what to do about 
our economy.1 
This Article has three movements. In Part II, I discuss conceptual 
obstacles to forming the new elite consensus that rethinking the role of 
financial markets requires.2 To produce policy reform, it is not enough to 
have new ideas; the ideas must be understood, adopted, and acted upon 
by people. Policy reform is thus always a function of conversations. 
In Part III, I discuss some possible ways the elite consensus might 
be formed. I have tried to put these thoughts into practice: The World 
Economic Association (WEA)3 held a global, virtual “conference” on 
financial market reform and asked me to design and host the forthcoming 
“Rethinking Financial Markets: Social Capitalism, Economies of Money, 
                                                            
* Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, State University of New York 
(SUNY) at Buffalo. I thank Chuck O’Kelley and Marc Moore for hosting the Berle IV Conference in 
London, the immediate occasion for these remarks. I also thank Jack Schlegel, as usual, for reading 
well, and Sean O’Brian for quick research assistance. This Article is largely a reflection on a virtual 
conference held by the World Economics Association. It has been a pleasure working with that team: 
Grazia Letto-Giles, Stuart Birks, Ed Fullbrook, Jake McMurchie, Nick Kraft, and Richard Whelan. 
 1. See G.W.F. HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, at XX (J. Sibree trans., 
George Bell & Sons 1902) (1837); see also Thomas Carlyle, Occasional Discourse on the Negro 
Question, FRASER’S MAG. FOR TOWN & COUNTRY 531 (1849). 
 2. See SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD, POLITICAL ELITES IN MODERN SOCIETIES: EMPIRICAL RE-
SEARCH AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1989). 
 3. See WORLD ECON. ASS’N, http://www.worldeconomicsassociation.org (last visited Oct. 20, 
2012). 
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and Custodial Regulation.”4 Central to the design of the conference is an 
intentionally provocative frame, a “Problematique,” which is intended 
both to elicit responses and give those responses a common point of ref-
erence, thereby lending coherence to the enterprise. Incidentally, I hope 
that the political economy suggested by the Problematique is interesting, 
but the thrust is social, not substantive.5 
The reader should ask whether any of this works—is the design any 
good? Can such conferences help to foster intellectually creative consen-
sus? In order to help the reader answer that question, Part IV reproduces 
the Problematique so the reader may judge for herself how she might 
have responded and whether the aggregate of such responses might be 
understood to contribute to a politically operative consensus. 
In Part V, the conclusion, I offer a preliminary assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken by “Rethinking Finan-
cial Markets,” which goes “live” as this journal goes to press. 
II. REFLEXIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE PARALYSIS OF ELITES 
My central notion is quite modest with regard to the relations be-
tween the abstracted discourse of political economy and actual economic 
life (and so social and political life), if perhaps problematic for econo-
mists and other policy professionals: the difficulties we confront in think-
ing or talking seriously about political economy are deeply entwined, 
even intrinsic, to the problems within our political economy. To put the 
matter in highfalutin terms: our meta-discourse (the various disciplines 
comprised by “political economy” as an enterprise) and our practice (the 
web of institutions, laws, economic interests, technologies, social under-
standings, and the like comprised by our business, in the broad sense of 
the work of society) entail one another. 
Thus, when we find ourselves in financial crisis, as we have since 
2008, we see, in tandem, difficulties within policy communities. The dis-
courses that might be used to address the crisis have themselves been 
embarrassed, and so impaired, by the same crisis. Responses have been 
rather feeble.6 To put matters simply: confronted with a serious crisis, 
                                                            
 4. See Rethinking Financial Markets: Social Capitalism, Economies of Money, and Custodial 
Regulation, WORLD ECON. ASS’N, http://rfconference2012.worldeconomicsassociation.org (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 5. The question of how to instigate meaningful encounters among elites is a preoccupation of 
contemporary anthropology. See, e.g., PAUL RABINOW ET AL., DESIGNS FOR AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
THE CONTEMPORARY (2008). 
 6. For example, many of the provisions embodied in regulatory efforts after the financial crisis 
have been surrounded by uncertainty and second-guessing. Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (provisions for 
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policy elites may become unsure of themselves and have difficulty mak-
ing up their minds. 
Of course, uncertainty is not confined to policy discourse about the 
economy, but instead pervades economic activity: there appears far more 
uncertainty in the realms of employment, investment, and business life 
generally. Even though the government has been deadlocked for years,7 
conservatives in the United States like to decry “regulatory uncertainty,” 
as if the only impediment to decisive action by economic actors were 
rumors of a tsunami of unpredictable legislation. But the problem of un-
certainty is simpler and more pervasive: it makes it difficult to invest, to 
hire, to spend, and to grow. Consider Japan since the late 1980s, the 
United States today, and the Eurozone debacle. In September 2012, the 
chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, announced that the state 
of the U.S. economy was not entirely satisfactory, and he hinted that fur-
ther reduction in the cost of capital might be necessary.8 Indeed, a short 
trip to any big box retailer or auto dealership, where Bernanke presuma-
bly would have been offered 0% financing for years,9 namely, at a nega-
tive real interest rate, suggests that the cost of capital is not impeding 
borrowing.10 Worse, the need to offer financing at such low rates sug-
gests that consumers, even those with money or at least high credit rat-
ings, are so uncertain that they cannot relax with their purchasing power. 
This interplay between thought and action—more precisely, be-
tween awareness of confusion and unwillingness to act—creates serious 
problems for political economy. Economists in particular are fond of as-
serting that “we know what should be done, but the problems are politi-
cal.” This is a convenient lie, recalling the old joke about the ruler who 
asked several economists a question and got more answers than there 
were respondents. But let us forgive professional posturing—there is a 
real problem here. To say, in effect, that “we know but are not responsi-
ble” is simplistic. There is no political economy without politics—there 
is no market that is not situated within a society, with institutions, created 
                                                                                                                                     
swaps and internal business are still yet to be fully articulated), with DAVID A. WESTBROOK, OUT OF 
CRISIS: RETHINKING OUR FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009). 
 7. Although examples of political deadlock are legion, the inability to pass a federal budget in 
2011 serves as a recent example. See Robert Pear, Budget Stalemate Leaves Chaos at Many Agen-
cies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/us/15spend.html. 
 8. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Economic Symposium (Aug. 31, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.business 
week.com/news/2012-08-31/bernanke-remarks-at-jackson-hole-economic-symposium-text). 
 9. See, e.g., Current Ads, NEBRASKA FURNITURE MART, http://www.nfm.com/flipbk.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2012) (offering thirty-six months interest-free financing). 
 10. With interest rates so low, investors may be unwilling to lock up money, and it can be 
difficult to close deals. 
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and operated through social processes commonly called “political.”11 
Thus, any answer to even a seemingly objective question—for example, 
should interest rates be raised, lowered, or held steady—entails a set of 
assumptions about the operation of the central bank, the health of finan-
cial industries, the capacities of regulators, the mechanics of the creation 
of credit, and so forth, as well as the usual concerns about the state of 
play. 
To put matters differently, economic policy questions (always some 
version of “what is to be done?”) do not arise in the abstract. Such ques-
tions are, as suggested above, inescapably situated within a context al-
ready defined by the political and economic life of the day. Moreover, 
economic policy questions are inescapably subjective in the very literal 
sense of pertaining to subjects and actors, that is, those who constitute 
politics. How to spend money available at an X rate of interest is a ques-
tion that arises among subjects and is addressed by subjects. Any policy 
solution, whatever it is that we in the policy intellectual community 
claim to know, thus inescapably presumes the participation, and even 
belief, of those actual individuals, who must decide whether to buy, sell, 
hire, hoard, or invest, that we collectivize and address as “the economy.” 
Therefore, in questions of political economy, to divide knowledge (what 
we know) from politics (what we can convince other people to do) is 
highly disingenuous. There is no knowledge without politics. Specifical-
ly, there can be no discussion of monetary policy without implicating the 
creation and operation of money, and various forms of credit, within a 
society.12 This is how such things are imagined by those making policy 
matters for the conduct of policy. 
Conversely, the fact that politics is broken—as it is widely believed 
to be in Washington and Europe—raises serious theoretical issues for 
those of us who do more thinking than acting, precisely because our the-
orizing (of whatever stripe) entails politics, an institutional setting, and 
so forth. But if we are uncertain about the institutional and social terrain 
on which our ideas operate, then our ability to think in the abstract (to 
use theory) to suggest ways forward is compromised. Conversations 
about the Eurozone, for example, often presume treaty changes that will 
bring forth a continental nation with vast and wise administrative capaci-
                                                            
 11 . See generally DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT (2003). 
 12. No reference to the French philosopher Michel Foucault is intended. 
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ty.13 So can openers, in this case the peaceful realization of the Napole-
onic dream, will be presumed.14 
It thus seems that serious and pragmatic thinking about political 
economy should also attend to when and where the situation of policy 
thought is in the present practice. For example, as discussed further be-
low, the present election of a President is dominated by talk of jobs, for 
understandable reasons. However, less than half of the people in the 
United States work.15 The polity is larger than the labor market, and his-
torical trends indicate this is likely to increase. This demographic reali-
ty—that the majority of people will not get jobs—is obvious, but almost 
completely undigested. 
Campaigning for the Presidency, like operating monetary policy 
without visiting a big box store, proceeds with only a hazy impression of 
the world that ideas, glibly expressed, are said to represent and some-
times even affect. This is worrisome. Although elite language has often 
been disconnected from the world it governs (let them eat cake), it would 
be odd if governance did not suffer accordingly. Thus, in attending to the 
situation that our policy discourse addresses, we ought to connect our 
words to our worlds, lest economics become a peculiar sort of music. 
Even if we know what we are talking about, do we know how to 
talk about it with anybody else? The question for political economy is 
not just how intellectuals, as individuals, describe and understand the 
world conceived as an object of inquiry; rather, the question is how do 
people with the collective capacity to act on and within an economy 
(elites) make up their minds, thereby constituting the economy itself? 
That is, political economy is what the anthropologists call a profoundly 
reflexive enterprise—meaning that it cannot be, at bottom, a scientific 
enterprise. This reflexive or self-constituting idea of political economy is 
entailed in the relatively recent practice of inflation targeting, in which 
communications from central banks form the expectations that central 
banks seek to influence. The downside, however, seems more relevant: 
if, as suggested above, elite uncertainty is itself socially harmful, then 
how are elites to be encouraged to make up their minds—to cut entitle-
ments, increase the money supply, or do anything at all? 
                                                            
 13. See, e.g., Stephen Castle, Foreign Ministers Call for Stronger Ties Within Europe, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/world/europe/11-foreign-ministers-
call-for-greater-european-union-integration.html. 
 14 . See Mike Moffatt, Definition of Assume a Can Opener, ABOUT.COM, http://econ 
omics.about.com/od/termsbeginningwith1/g/assume_a_can_opener.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 15 . U.S. & World Population Clocks, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.cen 
sus.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012); Databases, Tables & Calculators by 
Subject, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS12000000 (last visited on 
Oct. 30, 2012). 
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Viewed in another way, it seems incredible that the world has 
changed so much and elite thinking has changed so little. In the years 
since the Great Recession began, why have we not seen seismic shifts in 
the structure of thought? 
One answer is time and how societies cope with historical change. 
In the fall of 2008, it became clear that a housing bubble had implica-
tions not only for the financial system, but for how we thought about fi-
nance as a whole, and this was only four years ago. Generations later, it 
can be difficult to remember that the New Deal did not begin to take le-
gal shape until four years after the Stock Market Crash of 1929, and the 
managerial-corporatist-statist capitalist order that was born in the New 
Deal was not fully mature until the Great Depression, World War II, and 
the postwar construction of the contemporary legal and institutional or-
der had run their course.16 So my question—why have we not rethought 
finance (along lines I have been working on, naturally)—bespeaks impa-
tience on my part. 
There are other reasons that political economy, despite its widely 
acknowledged shortcomings in practice, seems intellectually paralyzed. 
In the United States, the presidential term encourages a relatively short-
term understanding of political economy, a view of recent events as a 
“crisis” from which there is a “recovery,” a return to the status quo ante, 
rather than a departure and the emergence of a new set of economic cir-
cumstances, and perhaps a new understanding of what may be hoped 
from political economy. The Republican challenger asks, “Are you better 
off than you were four years ago?” implying that the current President 
has neither “fixed” the problem nor put mechanisms in place to fix the 
problem.17 Conversely, the President is forced to defend his record by 
saying that we are on the right path to getting “back.”18 But back to 
where? None of this implies a new understanding of what the nation 
should expect from political economy. 
Similar things might be said about the media, which tends to report 
new events, the scandal du jour, in terms of well-received understand-
ings. Facts change, but publicly acceptable narratives change far less of-
ten, which is why journalism is easy to understand even if the world is 
not. So the financial crisis, in both its United States and European chap-
ters, calls into question matters like the nature of federalism, central 
                                                            
 16. Consider the fact that the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, the first of the New Deal secu-
rities laws, was not passed until almost four years after the crash. The Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 were obviously passed much later. 
 17. See Jim Rutenberg, Democrats Say U.S. Is Better off than Four Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/us/politics/democrats-say-us-is-better-off-than-
4-years-ago.html?pagewanted=all. 
 18. See id. 
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banking, money, and the possibility of generalizing a middle class (or the 
justification of poverty), all of which is reported on as if questions pri-
marily for technocrats. 
Still, these explanations for why we have not seen more fundamen-
tal shifts in thinking seem unsatisfying. It may be that, as John Kenneth 
Galbraith wrote over fifty years ago: “Ideas are inherently conserva-
tive . . . . They yield not to the attack of other ideas but . . . to the massive 
onslaught of circumstances with which they cannot contend.”19 But isn’t 
the Great Recession the sort of “massive onslaught of circumstances”20 
that should foster rethinking? 
Similarly, it could easily be argued that policy actions, especially in 
2008–2009, meant that the relevant policy elites didn’t believe much that 
they had spent years saying (and we in the academy had been teaching) 
about markets. In 2008, an ideologically laissez faire U. S. administration 
made profound interventions into the economy, implying that the gov-
ernment did not really believe a host of propositions about market effi-
ciency, the ability to self-regulate, and the like.21 Immediate responses to 
the crisis logically entailed a different view of what we meant by market 
regulation and, by extension, political economy. This was not completely 
acknowledged by either the Bush or Obama Administrations, and cer-
tainly not digested by policy elites, not even in the academy. We simply 
updated our textbooks and soldiered on into what is looking like a lost 
decade, at least to our students. 
When the “crisis” passed—drama is not sustainable, even if eco-
nomic unhappiness is—policy discourse blithely carried on in roughly 
the same fashion, albeit with fewer references to efficiency. Looking 
back on the last four years, less was learned than one might have 
hoped.22 It remains to be seen whether the European debt crisis, and per-
sistently high unemployment in the United States, will be more signifi-
cant as a matter of intellectual history, but early signs are not good. Sure-
ly monetary policy, the only form of government intervention that seems 
to enjoy widespread support, will continue to be used to support econom-
ically marginal enterprises—meaning great swathes of society on both 
sides of the pond—without raising taxes too much. One will continue to 
hear nostrums about education, competitiveness, and growth, even if 
there is no evidence that these things are well understood, or can be made 
                                                            
 19. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 17 (4th ed., Penguin Books 1984) 
(1958). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See WESTBROOK, supra note 6, at ch.1. 
 22. Compare WESTBROOK, supra note 6, with American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-115, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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to work for most people or even most countries. In short, intellectual 
consensus may not be revised, even in the face of dramatic circumstanc-
es. 
We seem to be in a period of widespread elite malaise; the Zeitgeist 
is ill. As a matter of academic policy discourse, we observe a stubborn 
inability to substantively revise patterns of thought. The old dogs are not 
learning new tricks; the paradigm will not shift. Politically, we see an 
inability to reach agreement, marked by hollow ideological posturing, 
symbolized by Standard and Poor’s downgrade of U.S. debt, and of 
course the farcical quality of Eurozone politics, so aptly skewered by 
Wolfgang Munchau in the Financial Times and especially his blog 
Eurointelligence.23 Economically, we observe a shaky collective confi-
dence, the flight to safe havens, scant hiring, and little will to reform any-
thing, from healthcare to banking, even if nothing is working and few 
people are happy with the status quo. Academically, because the entire 
edifice has collapsed24 and not been replaced, we are politically ineffec-
tual, passive or ideologically shrill (“[t]he best lack all conviction, while 
the worst, [a]re full of passionate intensity”25), and so economically mor-
ibund, unwilling to invest, to hire, to venture. 
Let us leave for future historians the question of why this is so, of 
why our elites have done what certainly appears to be an unimpressive 
job of confronting the challenges of our era. Perhaps it was ever thus. 
Maybe we simply do not enjoy enough distance to veil the ugly particu-
lars of recent events. Be that as it may, how are we, who after all must 
live now, to respond? 
III. VIRTUAL CONFERENCES AND REAL CONSENSUS? 
A. An Opportunity to Respond 
While I was struggling with such gloomy thoughts, an opportunity 
to respond arose. The WEA asked me to host a virtual conference on 
“Rethinking Financial Markets.” I recently published a book, Out of Cri-
sis: Rethinking Our Financial Markets, which had some merits as a text 
and which had led to some interesting travel. Nonetheless, I considered it 
a practical failure, at least insofar as the book was prescriptive. It is odd-
                                                            
 23 . See generally EUROINTELLIGENCE: INFORMS, DEBATES, AND EDUCATES ABOUT THE 
EUROZONE, http://www.eurointelligence.com/eurointelligence-news/home.html (last visited Nov. 5, 
2012). 
 24. See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Reglators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Gov’t Oversight and Reform, 110th Cong. 17 (2008) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Former 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve). 
 25. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in MICHAEL ROBARTES AND THE DANCER 
(1921). 
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ly difficult to avoid being prescriptive. Publishers, editors, reviewers 
ask—What is your argument? What should we do? One must answer as 
convincingly as possible as a condition of expression. But any answer is 
bound to fail to convince, and so to fail as politics. Moreover, having 
failed, it seems hubristic to have thought that success was possible. I’m 
not the king.26 Those things said, the economy and the nation have been 
harmed. After the Great Recession, and after furious work on the part of 
many, so little rethinking had occurred. So this seemed like a chance to 
try, once again, to remake political economy after my own heart. Less 
bitterly, I was honored to be asked, even if I was disgusted with political 
economy, suspicious that middle-age anxieties were skewing my judg-
ment, and looking forward to my sabbatical. I accepted the invitation. 
The WEA is a global institution organized online (most of the prin-
cipals are in the United Kingdom). The organization is devoted to the 
renewal of economics as a discipline and, it is widely hoped, the better-
ment of actual economies.27 In the year of its founding, the WEA had 
become the second largest economic institution in the world with over 
10,000 members. Its largest journal has over 20,000 subscribers.28 
There is intellectual politics in the WEA: it has a “manifesto” and 
aspires to create a “pluralist” context for economic discourse. 29  The 
WEA is founded on the proposition that the discipline of economics is 
too narrow methodologically, ideologically, and geographically. The 
publishers of the Real World Economics Review, originally published as 
the Post-Autistic Economics Review, founded the WEA.30 They argued 
that an unrealistic understanding of economic life dominated the eco-
nomics discipline, where scholars were more committed to models than 
to understanding the world. Unsurprisingly, discourse in the WEA tends 
to lean leftward. 
The WEA claims that its meteoric success reflects a widespread 
discontent with orthodox academic economics.31 Discontent with eco-
nomics is not merely intellectual: mainstream economics provides policy 
arguments that are used to make real decisions, especially in the deregu-
lation of financial markets, and thus mainstream economics may be 
                                                            
 26. I am not even Keynes. 
 27. “The World Economics Association (WEA) seeks to increase the relevance, breadth and 
depth of economic thought. Its key qualities are worldwide membership and governance, and inclu-
siveness with respect to: (a) the variety of theoretical perspectives; (b) the range of human activities 
and issues which fall within the broad domain of economics; and (c) the study of the world’s diverse 
economies.” Manifesto, WORLD ECON. ASS’N, http://www.worldeconomicsassociation.org/wea/ 
manifesto (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
 28. See WORLD ECON. ASS’N, supra note 3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
1196 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1187 
blamed for much of the recent financial crisis.32 In short, many people 
are worried that economics has not only gone astray, but also it is leading 
our leaders astray, and the WEA seems to be a place where such bad ide-
as are contested. And it costs nothing to join the WEA, so many people 
do. 
As should be clear, my motives to accept the invitation were not en-
tirely pure. The WEA is enormous, and this invitation presented an op-
portunity to get a large audience for my thinking. I did not have clear 
expectations, but I was disappointed that Out of Crisis had not made a 
larger impact. 
It should be clear, however, I was and am supportive of the WEA, 
and I am broadly in agreement with its critique of the conduct of modern 
political economy. The invitation to host “Rethinking Financial Markets” 
offered an opportunity to reason how elites could communicate in a 
grounded fashion. Maybe “Rethinking” could provide literally that, a 
chance to start anew, to reconceive what was meant by the conduct of 
political economy in a world that was now, after the financial crisis, un-
derstood differently. Moreover, a digital conference offered a chance to 
encourage others and spur new conversations. “Rethinking Financial 
Markets” seemed, in short, to be a long shot at a fresh start. This is too 
dramatic, but the point is that recent economic events warrant real intel-
lectual, policy, and perhaps political renewal, and even the hope for so-
cial betterment. 
It still is not obvious how these aspirations were to be realized, 
even modestly. 
B. Forms of Response 
Policy academics, including law professors, primarily respond to 
social problems through their scholarship, which is much of what aca-
demics do. “Research” is expressed primarily as articles, which can be 
shortened for some contexts (blogs, op-eds) and occasionally expanded 
(books). Publication, it is presumed, helps to inform policy discourse, 
thereby improving society. 
If only it were so easy. The academic article is, on its very best day, 
an awkward form for policy discourse. With studied naiveté, the text 
paints an ostensibly objective picture of the world, from which the author 
is effaced. Yet somehow the author’s normative conclusions inexorably 
follow from this objective depiction. Implicitly, the text maintains, the 
relevant elites will recognize the rightness of the argument and govern 
themselves accordingly. 
                                                            
 32. See generally WESTBROOK, supra note 6. 
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Many objections to legal scholarship are familiar and do not require 
rehearsal here. Practitioners and judges have often complained that the 
mass of legal scholarship is irrelevant, utopian, and useless for what they 
do.33 Even the Harvard Law Review says articles are often too long.34 
Academics in other disciplines note that legal scholarship is reviewed, 
and published, by students who do not know anything else. And over the 
years, even many within the legal academy have argued that legal schol-
arship is in bad faith, disingenuous arguments to foregone conclusions 
made for reasons of professional advancement, institutional maintenance, 
political oppression, moral hygiene, or simply to have something to do. 
These criticisms of legal scholarship—and with minor modifica-
tions, policy scholarship in other disciplines—may all be valid. For pur-
poses of fostering a new consensus, however, the problem that seems 
salient to me is that didactic scholarship, by its very structure, places the 
reader in a passive position. The article says: the following research was 
done, the following truths emerged, and the following steps (perhaps just 
further research) should be undertaken. So it is. 
Confronted with such text, an academic reader may remember to 
cite the text if he agrees or wants to please the author and if he has a 
vaguely relevant text “in the pipeline” (far more likely in the case of a 
junior reader). Or the reader may, in rare circumstances, argue with the 
text (also likely in the case of a junior reader). But most of the time, as a 
practical matter, there is nothing for the reader to do but express approval 
or disapproval to nobody in particular. As Pierre Schlag explains, you get 
to the end of a successful policy piece (and therefore, the rule should be 
X) and say to yourself, in Bertie Woosterish fashion, “Right Ho! Where 
do I sign?”35 But the vast majority of articles give no thought to how the 
argument, even if convincing, is to be realized. Presumably, legislators 
somewhere will pass a law to make it so, in recognition of the rightness 
of the argument and fulfillment of their duty as legislators. 
                                                            
 33. In an interview with C-Span, Chief Justice Roberts stated, “Pick up a copy of any law 
review that you see, and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on 
evidentiary approaches in 18th century Bulgaria or something, which I’m sure was of great interest 
to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much use to the bar.” Chief Justice John Roberts, Discus-
sion at the Annual 4th Cir. Conf. (June 25, 2011); see also Richard Posner, Against the Law Reviews, 
LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 57 (“The result of the system of scholarly publication in law is 
that too many articles are too long, too dull, and too heavily annotated, and that many interdiscipli-
nary articles are published that have no merit at all.”). Why professors should be writing for judges 
is less clear. 
 34. A Harvard Law Review study of over 800 law professors found 90% of respondents found 
law review articles to be too long. Law Review Usage Survey Results, HARV. L. REV. (July 2005), 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/law_review_usage_survey_results.pdf. 
 35. “Where do I sign” is from personal conversation with the scholar and critic of U.S. legal 
scholarship Pierre Shlag. For more on Bertie Woolster, see the works of P.G. Wodehouse. 
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This is not always the case. Sometimes a reader holds some form of 
relevant power; perhaps she is a judge or a legislator. Or, more likely, her 
staffer, or a political activist, reads something that seems relevant to an 
issue of importance, perhaps the antagonism with Iran. An idea, for ex-
ample, that a corporation doing business with a regime designated by the 
U.S. government as a state sponsor of terrorism is something U.S. inves-
tors would want to know and should be disclosed as a matter of securities 
law, may be brought to the attention of the powers that be, and may even 
be made law. This can happen—my wife, Amy, wrote two such arti-
cles36—but does not happen often. 
It is important to note that the conflict with Iran predated the schol-
arly idea. Using securities disclosure as a soft sanction provided a clever 
way to use existing legal mechanisms (mandatory disclosure under the 
securities laws) to put some pressure on Iran. Here, scholarship served 
existing political interests and used existing legal and institutional mech-
anisms. All of this may be a good thing, and certainly preferable to war 
with Iran, but it does not amount to renewal. 
Of course it is a bit foolish to think about legal scholarship in terms 
of the reader. Scholarship is almost entirely about writing, not reading. 
Quite apart from substance, articles are a coin of the scholarly realm, 
used to get teaching jobs, tenure, maintain institutional standing, and the 
like. It is a lovely thing to have readers, but actual readers (people) are 
not necessary. An imagined “reader” is sufficient to organize the text. 
In contrast to scholarly production, however, politics does not exist 
without the participation of the people in that polity. Thus, the didactic 
character of the scholarly article, as a form, is politically problematic. 
The reader, even the reader who is powerful outside the text, is asked to 
submit to the authority, the logical validity, of the argument. Under such 
circumstances, even a sympathetic reader may be somewhat noncommit-
tal, and most readers will find some reason to demur—or not to read at 
all.37 In short, legal scholarship is an awkward vehicle for building or 
especially revising elite consensus. 
If didactic scholarship—including my own—is unlikely to build 
new consensus with which to confront extraordinary times, perhaps the 
conference is more promising. Like the dinner parties of the title, confer-
                                                            
 36. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality 
Excuse Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13 (2011); see also 
Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s In Your Portfolio: U.S. Investors Are Unknowingly Financing State 
Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151 (2010); cf. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. (2012). The Act, along with Obama’s October 9, 2012 
Executive Order, prohibits subsidiaries from doing what their parents cannot do in Iran and imple-
ments enhanced disclosure rules for public companies relating to Iran (in 10Ks and 10Qs). 
 37. See Roberts, supra note 33 (discussing discontent with law review articles). 
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ences can provide an occasion for people to talk to one another. Regard-
less of what they say, the salient point is that this is already a more so-
cial, and hence incipiently political, activity. At a conference, people 
have to participate with one another. 
The WEA’s invitation was fortuitous in another way, which in 
hindsight is quite profound for me. I have spent years talking with cul-
tural anthropologists, George Marcus and Doug Holmes, and people I 
met through them, about ways of approaching present situations; those 
conversations were ultimately issued in a book, Navigators of the Con-
temporary.38 Today, my friends in anthropology spend much of their ef-
fort designing various sorts of engagements, events, to which people 
bring various knowledge gained from their own practices in, for exam-
ple, central banking. At least on good days, new truths emerge out of 
such engagements. 
So the invitation to host the WEA’s conference on “Rethinking Fi-
nancial Markets” posed an interesting question—Could a virtual confer-
ence be used to further, or embody, consensus making among elites? 
Could a conference format be used to foster new thinking? Could such 
new thinking take on social and collective form, that is, become a politi-
cal position as opposed to an individual’s view? Ambitions must of 
course be kept in check. These things happen slowly, if at all. But hope 
springs. 
C. A Design for a Digital Conference 
1. Managing the Virtual 
The WEA and its conferences “take place” on the web. What does 
the digital character of “Rethinking Financial Markets” mean for actually 
building consensus? As is often the case, figuring out the substantive 
significance of digital interaction has not been obvious. Superficially, 
however, the conference’s digital character meant that “Rethinking Fi-
nancial Markets” could be global. Many people could get involved, 
without an unlimited travel budget, and without undue time or travel 
pressure. Flying from the United States to Australia, for instance, is no 
small undertaking. So perhaps the low cost of individual involvement is 
the most obvious consequence of the digital character of the conference, 
at least in comparison to presenting a paper at a traditional “live” confer-
ence. 
                                                            
 38. See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE CONTEMPORARY: WHY ETHNOGRAPHY 
MATTERS (2008). 
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A disadvantage of web-based conferences is almost as obvious. The 
web fragments as well as connects. How could the conference be orga-
nized to keep people from simply expressing their well-established per-
sonal views, rather than engaging in conversation and perhaps fresh 
thought? If it is easy to get involvement via the web, real engagement, 
and by extension, conversation or consensus, seems much harder to come 
by. The web is a big place, there is much to do, and everyone is busy, or 
at the very least distracted. Why would people participate? And if they 
do participate, would they do so with each other—or would we simply 
succeed in providing another venue for people to express themselves, as 
they do for online shopping and what used to be print journalism? To 
return to the metaphor of the dinner party, the timing and substance of 
“Rethinking Financial Markets” were quite intentionally designed to ad-
dress these concerns. 
2. Scheduling 
Roughly speaking, the conference unfolded as follows: the WEA 
made its decision to give this conference, and in 2011 I accepted respon-
sibility for hosting it. After some discussion, it was decided that “Re-
thinking Financial Markets” would be the third WEA conference, and the 
“live” portion would take place in the fall of 2012. This meant that prep-
aration for the conference would take place in the late winter, spring, and 
summer of 2012. 
During winter into spring, I spent time thinking about what the 
WEA might hope to accomplish and, more simply, what the specific 
themes and topics of the conference should be. I wrote a 
“Problematique” to frame the event in what I hoped were useful ways, 
just different enough to be provocative and general enough to encourage 
broad participation. The Problematique included specific topics that par-
ticipants were encouraged to address, and it forms Part IV of this Arti-
cle.39 
The WEA established a webpage dedicated to the conference. The 
WEA used the webpage to communicate to the world, and to facilitate e-
mails with actual and prospective conference participants in particular, 
under the motto “further information is available on the webpage.” Con-
versely, participants used the webpage to register for the conference, 
submit papers, and, in due course, post comments. Thus, the webpage 
gave the conference a virtual “place.” 
Next, the WEA made a general call for papers through the newslet-
ter of the WEA and through various mailing lists. I also made personal 
                                                            
 39. See infra Part IV. 
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invitations to dozens of people, mostly via lengthy emails, explaining 
what the WEA was, what we were hoping to accomplish, and how easy 
and useful it would be to participate. Most of these people I knew be-
forehand, and I had an indirect connection to the others. Many invitees 
were friends. Numerous invitees said they would try to deliver a paper, 
and many of them have. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that much of this 
conference’s content—as with “live” academic conferences—depends on 
individuals with personal or professional relationships for whom the con-
ference is incidental, an opportunity to do or return a favor. 
I recruited a few people I respected to vet papers, mostly to make 
sure nothing libelous was in the texts. On November 1, 2012, the web-
master will post the papers and will email links to conference partici-
pants. Papers will be organized under a broad topic area, and will be 
searchable by topic and keyword. The papers will be posted for a month, 
and the authors are expected to reply to comments. At the end of the 
month, the materials will be archived. 
3. Inviting 
Despite the fact that this is an “open” conference, we have given 
considerable thought to the “invitation,” both in the sense of who to in-
vite (who would contribute something worthwhile) and, conversely, how 
to make the conference itself inviting and appealing to those invited. 
It is important to make the conference as inviting as possible be-
cause people have plenty of other things to do. Nonetheless, many in-
vitees have said they are too busy. Where possible, I have emphasized 
the importance of the conference, as well as the importance of the other 
attendees. Here, as elsewhere, the Internet has changed less than might 
be expected. More specifically, where possible I have suggested that par-
ticipation in this conference would enhance one’s professional reputa-
tion, though this claim is not too strong in light of the open call for pa-
pers. Again, many people I am engaged with are already well estab-
lished, and participating in this conference, or not, will not change their 
standing one iota. What is more plausible, for some, is that a larger glob-
al audience might see these proceedings and they might find new readers. 
At the end of the day, however, a fair number of people have written 
more or less because I asked them to, and it didn’t interfere with their 
lives too much. 
Under contemporary conditions, and in light of the fact that few 
participants have much to gain from contributing, I thought the confer-
ence needed to be as accessible as possible, especially for people that 
were invited directly. I emphasized that contributions could be short and 
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did not need to have academic apparatus. The idea has been to encourage 
a range of experts to build upon what they knew already. 
Making the conference too easy carries the risk that no work will be 
done, that the contributions will be too lightweight, mere opinions, and 
that the conference will therefore add no value. This risk is probably not 
as great as it initially appears. Here again, the social and professional 
context of the participants is probably more significant than the design of 
the conference: people say intelligent things—or not so intelligent 
things—because that is what they do and a large part of who they are. 
D. Fostering Conversation 
The foregoing ideas do little to address a fundamental difficulty—If 
people do not meet, in the same place and at the same time, will they 
confer? Are people simply likely to publish their own thinking, without 
undue attention to others (as is often the case on the Internet)? More gen-
erally, why—or how—can a virtual conference attain at least some of the 
conversational (collegial, dialogic, collective) character of an actual con-
ference? And if the reason to give a virtual conference is to encourage a 
politics, the formation of elite consensus on financial markets (at least for 
me if not necessarily the WEA), then is not the failure to produce such 
context fatal to the success of the undertaking? 
Two mechanisms seek to address this difficulty. First, participants 
can comment on papers, regardless of whether they submit a paper them-
selves. The authors are expected to respond to comments. The desire to 
judge things ranging from books to refrigerators to editorials seems to be 
very strong among denizens of the Internet. This is an advantage of vir-
tual conferences. Commenting at an actual conference, which amounts to 
public speaking, is daunting for many people. Also, one person may 
comment at an actual conference at a time, and yet this single speaker 
demands the attention of the entire audience. Thus many people cannot, 
or will not, express their opinions. In a digital environment, lots of peo-
ple can express lots of opinions. In short, the urge to comment should, in 
and of itself, encourage a “conversational” style of participation in a vir-
tual conference. 
“Rethinking Financial Markets” has a second, more substantive 
mechanism to encourage conversation in spite of the digital nature of the 
event. “Rethinking Financial Markets” is not a completely open invita-
tion to present one’s own ideas on the topic. Instead, it is an invitation to 
rethink finance as that problem is put forth by the conference itself. A 
lengthy Problematique sets forth the topics of the conference. This is a 
conference on an intentionally provocative vision of the tasks confront-
ing political economy now. Participants are thus placed in a responsive 
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position, asked to relate their knowledge to the conference’s questions. 
Contributors each bring their own knowledge and perspectives, their pri-
vate intellectual capital, to the table, but because the Problematique is 
shared, it serves as a point of commonality for the enterprise. The 
Problematique, as occasion for the papers, thus (in theory) creates a hub 
and spoke structure for the conference—which ideally allows for the 
widest possible range of responses, from participants all over the planet, 
yet also encourages the emergence of themes and connections. 
Provocation is its own reward, but for this conference, provocation 
also has a dialogic purpose. The Problematique is intended to sufficiently 
unsettle the presumptions of the contributors to make them respond. In 
responding, contributors are responding to the same thing, and therefore 
the contributions relate to one another, even in the absence of actual, di-
rect conversation. 
So the idea is that new thinking, indeed provocation, would engen-
der responses from various positions creating a hub and spoke structure 
that would form a digital analogue to live conversation, and (perhaps) 
would foster the emergence of consensus. 
In general, the Problematique highlights tension between what is 
broadly understood to be social reality—the way we live now and the 
imaginary that informs much education and policy—what we might 
without rancor call mythos or ideology. We know this (about economic 
and social life at the present time) but we keep saying that (orthodox po-
litical economy). The Problematique thus begs the question: If we took 
better account of our world, how would we go about thinking about the 
financial markets that might be available to us? 
IV. PROBLEMATIQUE: SOCIAL CAPITALISM, ECONOMIES OF MONEY, 
AND CUSTODIAL REGULATION 
A. Introduction 
It is not wrong to believe that recent financial crises and general 
discontent with the economy demand not just regulatory reform, but also 
more fundamental reconsideration of the purposes, contexts, and meth-
ods of financial regulation. However, as contemporary policy discourse 
conclusively demonstrates, the emergence of fresh thinking tends to be 
hampered by more or less subtle anachronisms, patterns of thought that 
hardly describe the world and so obstruct the achievement of collective 
intentions. If we were to redescribe the world, we could reconsider the 
politics of finance writ large. 
This WEA conference aims to foster just such a collective recon-
sideration of the social role of finance and, consequently, the regulation 
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of financial markets. As for any collective consideration of such a vast 
topic, a key difficulty is coherence—how to make something cogent out 
of a call to rethink financial markets, which raises myriad concrete and 
specific issues. 
In an effort to provide a shared reference point for discussion, a hub 
for many spokes, this Problematique sets forth three general and contest-
able suppositions for contemporary thought about the sensible construc-
tion of financial markets going forward. This Problematique then asks 
more specific questions in a number of contexts, which numerous talent-
ed scholars have been invited to address. Of course, the participants may 
also expand upon or take issue with the general suppositions. And all of 
the proceedings will be available for public comment—the hope is that 
the set of contributions will coalesce into a broad yet trenchant consider-
ation of the issues raised by contemporary financial markets and, by ex-
tension, political economy writ large. 
The first supposition on which this conference proceeds (discussed 
in more detail below) is the idea that a great deal of social life has been 
capitalized, so that individuals and institutions in all reaches of society 
are directly dependent on the functioning of capital markets. Consequent-
ly, much of politics (including legal regulation and humane sentiment) 
should be understood to operate through financial markets, rather than in 
opposition to markets—hence, “social capitalism.” As a corollary, finan-
cial market regulation should be understood as constitutive of core social 
processes, rather than the correction of the “failure” of some natural 
market. Markets are a form of politics and should be evaluated accord-
ingly. 
Second, the traditional imagination of finance, founded on concep-
tions like the scarcity of capital and intermediation, and legitimated by 
promises of innovation and growth, has become outdated due to this 
same capitalization of social life (that is, by the success of finance itself). 
Wall Street has colonized Main Street: financial markets, often even 
banked assets, are larger than the “real” economies they were meant to 
serve. The discipline of finance should be reinvented to account for the 
mercurial sea of liquidity that characterizes “economies of money.” 
Third, and in consequence of the first two suppositions, the practice 
of financial regulation should shift focus from fostering the formation 
and allocation of capital, to maintaining the stability of the institutions—
now all perforce monetary institutions—on which contemporary social 
life depends—hence, “custodial regulation.” 
As noted, these suppositions are all contestable. As a matter of in-
tellectual history, few ideas are logically necessary. It is quite possible 
that financial markets shall not be reconsidered along the lines suggested 
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here. Were the suppositions mentioned above and clarified below to be 
taken seriously however, the practice of financial regulation would 
change in concrete ways. Our institutions, and hence economy, would 
evolve differently. 
After discussion of these general suppositions in more detail below, 
this Problematique will list a series of propositions, designed to stimulate 
and focus discussion, and to explore possible directions and concrete 
proposals for matters ranging from sovereign debt to exchange regulation 
to labor markets. 
B. General Suppositions 
1. Social Capitalism 
Much of a contemporary society’s work depends on capital mar-
kets. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the United States, where 
healthcare, education, artistic and spiritual life, and retirement are largely 
provided through endowed institutions. Even in societies in which the 
state takes more direct responsibility for social needs, access to credit 
markets remains critical, as painfully illustrated by the sovereign debt 
aspects of the crisis in Europe. 
Moreover, ordinary economic operations at the individual, business, 
and governmental levels rely on well-functioning credit markets. The 
“real economy” runs more on credit than on cash. Consider, in this re-
gard, household credit cards, commercial paper markets, and credit fa-
cilities offered by banks to firms. Indeed, even cash, the payment system, 
and ultimately the institution of money itself require the health of lever-
aged financial institutions, as again illustrated by the European crisis. 
Once the functioning of the “ordinary” economy is understood to require 
smoothly operating capital markets, then the venerable tendency to un-
derstand finance as extraordinary (used to achieve something that the 
borrower cannot or will not pay for out of retained earnings, at least not 
immediately, such as the purchase of a house or a company) becomes 
less significant. Simply put, daily business in the real economy requires 
the financial economy to be functioning reasonably well. 
Understanding the extent to which capital suffuses contemporary 
societies has profound consequences for political economy. The tradi-
tional distinction between Main Street and Wall Street, and the related 
distinction between labor and capital, lose much of their normative force. 
Those who work and those who own are both dependent on capital mar-
kets. By extension, “the social” (once thought to be workers and their 
dependents) cannot be understood in simple opposition to capital, despite 
drastic increases in inequality, notably in the United States. Most obvi-
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ously, workers are dependent on capital markets to secure their retire-
ments. But more deeply, and as already suggested, nearly fifty percent of 
the U.S. population does not hold a job. Consider the old, children, stu-
dents young and not so young, the sick, caregivers, and so forth—all of 
whom are directly dependent on capital markets, or dependent on institu-
tions that are directly dependent on such markets. Political economy 
must see to these people, too. 
This capitalization of social life should mark a fundamental shift in 
social policy, even for those who think of themselves as progressive or 
on the left. In the present context, the task is not to oppose capital in the 
name of labor, conflated with humane sentiment; the task is to construct 
capital markets, indeed markets more generally, that serve people—
hence “social capitalism.” The object of regulation is not to correct for 
the failure of some market, but to design contexts in which relatively au-
tonomous actors competitively and cooperatively pursue social goods. 
2. Economies of Money 
The capitalization of social life has monetized contemporary econ-
omies. In recent decades, many markets in specific assets and obliga-
tions, ranging from houses to much compensation to pensions, have been 
replaced by markets in more liquid legal instruments. Such instruments 
tend to be abstractions from, and more or less faithful representations of, 
the economic relations in question. For example, traditionally closely 
held entities, notably investment banks, have been converted into corpo-
rations and their equity traded. The assets and liabilities of firms are 
managed through the free creation of legal entities, with consequences 
for both accounting and capital formation—and for the network of in-
debtedness, exposure, and systemic risk—as illustrated by the constella-
tion of structured finance, credit default swaps, and banks in 2008–2009. 
More generally, long- and short-term debt markets abound, and they are 
used by public and private institutions as well as households. The result-
ing debt streams, ranging from commercial rents to auto payments to 
home loans, are securitized as a matter of course. 
To put matters more generally, recall Marx’s observation that as a 
society becomes more commercial, social relations are replaced by per-
haps more productive, but less personal, economic relations—“all that is 
solid melts into air.” In recent years, we have witnessed a second wave 
of abstraction, as specific economic relations have been replaced by 
more formal and ephemeral claims, which are also more liquid. Insofar 
as contracts have been replaced by securities, namely, as (real) market-
place relations have been replaced by (financial) market relations, then 
political economy should be thought of in terms of finance, which is 
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hardly the same as thinking in terms of tangible goods and services—
hence, “economies of money.” 
The monetization or liquefaction of what is still often called the real 
economy has created a sea of liquidity. This liquidity needs to be man-
aged; the financial industry has grown apace. One may of course view 
causation, and even blame, the other way around: the financial industry 
had incentives to create and sell services and products that ultimately 
resulted in capitalizing a great deal of economic life. At any rate, the 
monetization of the real economy has required a lot of work. The disci-
pline of finance colonized management, providing conceptual tools for 
understanding business as if it were investment. Finance made the as-
sumption of risk—especially the extension of credit—seem more man-
ageable, and credit arrangements have proliferated. As already suggest-
ed, an essential objective of financial engineering has been to make illiq-
uid forms of property more liquid, and thus more easily managed. This 
makes it easier to reinvest assets in pursuit of higher returns, to smooth 
cash flows, and, perhaps most importantly, to diversify the risk common-
ly associated with large illiquid assets. 
But financial engineering need not confine itself to property, how-
ever ephemeral. Traditional banks, which now seek operating capital 
through commercial paper markets, or latterly, central banks (depositors 
and equity being hardly sufficient) regularly have assets in excess of 
their home country’s GDP. The development of derivative markets has 
meant that risks, always also understood to be opportunities, could be 
priced directly, without the need to own anything. Freed from the shack-
les of the material world, the supply of derivatives is limited only by the 
willingness of counterparties. Derivative markets are many times larger 
than the total value of the assets they were once thought to insure. To 
generalize, because the supply of bets and promises (legally binding in-
struments) is limited only by hope, financial markets—the sum of mone-
tary promises—have become much larger than the “real” economies of 
goods and services they supposedly finance. Thus, whether we begin 
with the abstraction of assets and obligations, or with the proliferation of 
finance, we find ourselves speaking of a global economy of money. 
While the development of fundamentally more liquid economies, 
and perhaps even economies of money, appear to be historical changes of 
the longue durée, much contemporary liquidity stems directly from poli-
tics in the ordinary sense. That is, although the development of an econ-
omy of money may be structural—a characteristic of global society 
founded on incessant representation and electronically mediated—much 
contemporary liquidity is occasional. The United States has cut taxes and 
borrowed money while fighting wars and funding rising entitlement 
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costs, especially in healthcare. Imprudent choices were made. In Europe, 
nations provided their people with ever more commodious European 
standards, equalized trade imbalances, and enjoyed more than a few bub-
bles, often despite lackluster growth and discouraging demographics, 
through massive private and public borrowing, and conversely, impru-
dent investing. The ability to repay—and hence the credit worthiness of 
borrowers and the soundness of lenders—is now in question. Surely 
more prudent policies were imaginable. The Chinese have pursued 
Ordnung and global market share through currency management, effec-
tively subsidizing the cost of capital worldwide, albeit at both systemic 
risk and substantial domestic human cost. 
Finance, in a fully monetized economy (to say nothing of an econ-
omy of money), cannot be understood in the traditional fashion. Tradi-
tionally, finance understands itself in terms of the allocation of scarce 
capital. The idea is that financial markets intermediate between savers, 
who have surplus social capital, and entrepreneurs, who have good ideas 
but cannot realize such ideas with their own assets. If capital markets are 
functioning well, good ideas will be realized; there will be innovation 
and thus growth. We may call this the Silicon Valley story. 
In a monetized economy, however, capital is in principle abundant, 
not scarce. Due to the relative scarcity of investment opportunities (and 
conversely, the surplus of available liquidity), lenders are impelled to use 
enormous amounts of leverage in an effort to profit from narrow spreads, 
thereby increasing systemic risk. To quip, in contemporary financial 
markets, during ordinary times, drowning appears to be a greater danger 
than dehydration. However in times of crisis, confidence—and hence 
liquidity—can evaporate, or at least flow away from specific contexts. 
Consider, in this regard, the market for auction-rate securities, interbank 
loans, or even the sovereign debt of some advanced countries. In each of 
these markets in recent years, liquidity was plentiful and cheap, until 
suddenly, it was expensive or even unavailable. Water is difficult to 
manage. 
The problem of growth is even more difficult for contemporary po-
litical economy than the challenges of rethinking finance in terms of the 
abundance rather than the scarcity of liquidity. Innovation, growth, and 
by extension job creation appear to be ephemeral and unpredictable. 
While ideas may require capital for their realization (the Silicon Valley 
story is not impossible, just very unlikely), the provision of capital is 
hardly tantamount to innovation. History gives us no reason to believe 
that everyplace will become a center of innovation. Most of the countries 
now at risk in Europe were not growing prior to the present crisis; eco-
nomic growth in the United States has been regionally concentrated even 
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during boom times. In short, it cannot be assumed that the structural re-
forms being undertaken worldwide, however sensible, will lead to inno-
vation—much less substantial growth—much less employment—in any 
direct or automatic fashion. 
Even good economic news may not be particularly good social 
news. Banks may raise capital without extending credit. Companies may 
improve their balance sheets, their production processes, and even grow 
without hiring more people. A fundamental difficulty for political econ-
omy is that the polity and the economy need not have the same demo-
graphic scope. The economy is likely to need less than all the people. 
People who cannot be expected to contribute to growth (the old, the sick, 
and most of the poor), people who simply will not contribute much to 
growth (most workers, most of the time), and most institutions and coun-
tries are nonetheless proper subjects of political economy, and they are 
also deeply invested in financial markets. In short, financial policy that 
depends on political justification for the uncertain hope of localized in-
novation and growth is hardly adequate for a social understanding of 
capitalism. 
3. Custodial Regulation 
In a global society in which social commitments have been capital-
ized and are held on a portfolio basis by highly leveraged and interde-
pendent institutions, the traditional imagination of finance—how to in-
termediate scarce capital between savers and worthy entrepreneurs while 
preventing fraud—should lose its dominance and be replaced by a more 
custodial understanding of the vitality of stable capital to social order and 
humane understandings of institutions. The managers of a pension fund, 
a university endowment, or even a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio—
rather than the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur—should become 
the paradigmatic figures for contemporary thinking about capitalism and 
its regulation. For such managers, the issue is fulfillment of fiduciary 
obligation, which requires the ability to deliver what and when promised. 
The paradigmatic fiduciary, the trustee, is the custodian of the benefi-
ciary’s interests; from a custodial perspective, finance is the mediation of 
existing social obligations among parties and across time. Growth is de-
sired but hardly essential: the fiduciary obligation exists nonetheless. 
The custodial perspective is thus quite different from the perspec-
tive traditionally taken by finance and epitomized by the rationally self-
interested venture capitalist, who seeks innovation and is willing to toler-
ate a substantial number of failures. Should the relevant elites take this 
conceptual turn to social capitalism operating on an economy of money, 
the aesthetics and practices of financial market regulation will be differ-
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ent from those that have characterized the last several decades. Rather 
than an emphasis on risk-taking in the hope for creative destruction that, 
on balance, may be said to serve society’s best interests, financial regula-
tion could become more explicitly concerned with the reliable flow of 
social capital. 
C. Policy Contexts 
What would financial policy and regulation look like if financial 
regulation were understood to be the construction of markets on which 
society could rely? 
1. Recent History and the Art of the Possible 
The financial crises from 2008 to the present have made apparent 
structural deficiencies in our financial markets and have impelled reform 
efforts. Although this entire Problematique might be understood to ask 
“what have we learned and what may be done,” the following general 
questions may be fruitful, especially in considering the more specific 
questions that follow. 
First, although the recent crises exhibited great greed and substan-
tial fraud, such human failings are by no means new. Moreover, in the 
right measure, things like self-interest, optimism, and trust are virtues, 
even if their exaggeration can lead to disaster. On the basis of recent ex-
perience, what might be said about the relations between human frailty 
and institutional structure that might guide the design of regulatory re-
gimes, the provision of incentives, and the establishment of sanctions? 
Second, crises often provide an opportunity for reform. At the same 
time, regulated actors often have interests opposed to reform and are po-
litically powerful in their own right. As one considers ideas for better 
financial markets, the question of political possibility looms large—Can 
we get there from here? For example, it might be argued that too many 
banks in European countries are overexposed to the sovereign debt of 
their own governments, meaning that fiscal crises can trigger financial 
crises and, in turn, further worsen conditions in the real economy. Better 
integration of European banking (weakening the links among a country’s 
government, banks, and local economy) might serve to ameliorate the 
effects of fiscal crisis on local financial institutions, businesses and 
households, and hence people. But is such denationalization and, inevita-
bly, consolidation of European banking politically imaginable? 
Third, consider the interaction of short-term and long-term 
measures. Oftentimes, a crisis requires immediate action in order to avert 
disaster. The intervention may nonetheless have long-term consequences. 
For example, in 2008 and into 2009, the United States financed the “pri-
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vate” acquisition of several institutions deemed too big to fail, resulting 
in the creation of even larger, and presumably systemically more im-
portant, institutions. Similar, the ECB’s injection of liquidity into finan-
cial institutions in late 2010 may have been necessary, but its medium-
term effects are being questioned. 
Fourth, interactions among institutions (markets, flows) of interna-
tional and national scope may be difficult to sort out precisely because of 
incongruities of scale, differences between what is “national” and what is 
“international” or even “global.” The obvious example is the now-
famous observation that financial institutions live and work international-
ly, but they die nationally. In response, it is not too difficult to call for an 
international bankruptcy code or, in a similar vein, international account-
ing standards, or even cross-border banking resolution. But how are such 
things to be achieved? To make matters more difficult, it is not clear 
when “the international” is superior to the national. Some things—
perhaps the establishment of a fiat currency is one of them—seem to 
function better if backed by a truly sovereign authority (for an American, 
it is not entirely clear when the federal is superior to the state.). Thus, in 
thinking about financial regulation—and hence constructing markets—
one must consider the political context in which such regulation takes 
place. 
2. Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
The governments of many advanced economies are in periods of 
substantial retrenchment or, at the very least, are arguing that such re-
trenchment is necessary in order to gain competitiveness and economic 
health. A few nations—China and Germany spring to mind—are running 
substantial surpluses (implying deficits elsewhere). Finally, in cases of 
highly indebted governments and recessionary economies, it has become 
commonplace to note that austerity measures may be procyclical. In all 
of these situations, it is argued that “progrowth” policies are necessary in 
order to work down current debts and for long-term welfare. 
From the perspective sketched above, at least three related prob-
lems suggest themselves. First, growth may not eventuate despite the 
establishment of virtuous policies. Second, and relatedly, surpluses imply 
deficits. If the issue is global (or even European) economic peace, then 
the answer mathematically cannot be universal trade surpluses and, prac-
tically speaking, will not be competitive equilibrium at some sort of me-
dian welfare. Finally, even if it occurs, growth may do little to address 
the social problems for which government is responsible, including, not 
incidentally, environmental concerns. But if “growth” is no North Star, 
then what guides fiscal and monetary policy? 
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3. Tax, Capital Formation, and Inequality 
Tax policy discourse, particularly in the United States, is character-
ized by several often conflicting values. First, it is argued that taxes on 
individuals and firms should be low so that capital may be concentrated 
and invested, leading to economic growth, employment, and ultimately 
higher tax revenues. Second, there is considerable anxiety that tax bur-
dens are falling unfairly on the broad middle class, who are also under-
stood to be the “backbone” of the nation. Inequality and therefore popu-
lism are rising. Populism is often understood to exert inflationary pres-
sure on policy making and otherwise to conflict with long-term interests 
of the polity—unless such arguments are merely camouflage for credi-
tors. Third, there is some sentiment to use tax as an incentive for good 
behavior (for example, saving for retirement) and a disincentive for less 
desirable but often necessary behavior (for example, driving a car or per-
haps, in Europe, trading securities). Fourth, taxes themselves may come 
at great political cost. Unwillingness to impose taxes, or inability to col-
lect taxes, may have encouraged governments to issue too much debt. 
How would adopting a self-consciously custodial capitalism affect the 
priorities of tax policy? 
4. Financial Instruments 
In response to the substantial human and institutional costs of re-
cent economic crises, and the anemic economies established in their 
wake, might we see a shift from an emphasis on disclosure-based regula-
tion of financial markets to a greater emphasis on substantive approaches 
to regulation? Recall that financial regulation, especially of securities 
markets but also of other markets, has been based on mandatory disclo-
sure and, more generally, the management of information. Since the 
1930s, across a range of markets, the law has tended to regulate infor-
mation about risk, rather than risk itself. Parties that are presumed to 
have both incentive and capacity to assess risk (for example, private eq-
uity investors, or hedge fund managers) have been allowed to operate 
with minimal regulation. To a lesser extent, other markets of significance 
to consumers (for example, real estate and health insurance) have also 
been regulated through the mandated provision of information designed 
to facilitate sound investment choices. 
At least three interrelated developments have put this approach to 
regulation under considerable strain: the degree of capitalization of so-
cially important institutions, and even households; the degree of leverage 
and interconnection found among institutions and households; and the 
prevalence of volatility and systemic risk. If financial regulation is un-
derstood in custodial—as opposed to entrepreneurial—terms, then it may 
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not be prudent to rely on the provision of sound information to guide 
consumer choices in relatively rational markets. 
A number of specific questions spring to mind. Is more substantive 
regulation of finance required? If so, in light of the difficulties inherent 
in risk assessment, perhaps most conspicuously demonstrated by rating 
agencies, how should such substantive regulation be designed? Should 
certain instruments or derivatives, such as over the counter derivatives, 
be banned outright? Or do efforts to move OTC trading onto exchanges 
suffice? 
5. Financial Markets (Exchanges) 
If the purpose of financial regulation is the ability to deliver social 
capital, then volatility is a real problem for the simple reason that human 
needs may occur during downturns. In light of recent losses in equity 
markets and perhaps interrupted employment, many people on defined 
contribution plans may have to postpone retirement indefinitely. The 
problem that volatility poses for social capitalism is exacerbated by the 
prevalence of systemic risk (by definition, risks that cannot be diversified 
away because asset prices move in the same direction). 
The desire to suppress unreasonable volatility (namely, the desire 
for relatively stable markets) may be seen to be in tension with widely 
held belief that the quantity of trading is positively correlated with in-
formational efficiency. Trading practices, notably including short selling, 
high-frequency trading, and even certain forms of insider trading, invari-
ably have been justified in the name of price discovery. Presumably, a 
shift toward more custodial notions of financial regulation would also 
shift the balance toward efforts at dampening volatility at the expense of 
at least some practices legitimated in terms of price discovery. Is this 
conflict with stability, and is it real? If so, is it avoidable? If it is not 
avoidable, how might one think about striking a balance? 
6. Financial Institutions 
Since at least early 2008, it has become clear that large, or merely 
highly connected, financial institutions may serve as vectors for systemic 
risk. It has also become clear that numerous financial institutions, while 
not legally defined as banks, exhibit the structural weaknesses of banks; 
the mismatch between the terms of assets and liabilities make such insti-
tutions vulnerable to “runs” and sudden collapse with potentially calami-
tous ramifications. Thus, the classic rationales for emergency interven-
tion into banks, and by extension bank regulation, apply to numerous 
institutions. Finally, events of recent years have demonstrated that many 
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such institutions were—and in many cases still may be—too leveraged 
and too integrated to be operated safely. 
In response, it has been broadly suggested (1) that such institutions 
should operate with more capital and less leverage, and (2) that financial 
institutions be disaggregated. At the same time, actual developments, 
notably consolidation in the banking industry in the United States and the 
liquidity policies of the European Central Bank, have tended to tighten, 
rather than loosen, the integration of the financial system. Moreover, the 
suggested reforms tend to lower the profit margin on permissible trades 
(because less leverage is used) and to prohibit presumptively profitable 
trades. 
Understandably, such reforms have been resisted by financial in-
dustry participants (the Volcker Rule is a pale shadow of Glass-Steagall). 
But while these new approaches to regulation are unlikely to be political-
ly palatable or practically easy, reforms nonetheless may be advisable. 
Thus, the question of how systemic risk within financial institutions may 
be reduced is conjoined with a narrow political question, namely, the 
extent to which a custodial understanding of financial regulation can 
overcome the class interests of financial industry insiders. 
7. Custodial Relations 
Entailed in the idea of social capitalism is the idea that financial 
markets themselves fairly directly serve human and institutional needs. 
The purpose of a mutual fund used for retirement purposes, or a line of 
credit, is to provide money when and where it is needed. Liquidity is just 
as necessary for modern life as is access to electricity or communication 
networks. The market’s institutions, in this view, are much like utilities, 
expected to run smoothly and consistently, to be reliable, and even to be 
boring. Profit margins ought to be concomitantly low, at least in contrast 
to expectations among contemporary market participants. 
Also entailed in the idea of social capitalism is that much capitalism 
takes place in and among not-for-profit institutions, including govern-
ments. That is, the distinction between public and private is far less clear 
in this context than it was once believed to be. What has become clear is 
that various institutions serve various missions that benefit different sets 
of people in different ways. By extension, we should expect to see far 
more articulated ideas of fiduciary relations—that is, the obligations 
owed by those in power over socially significant institutions, including 
for-profit corporations. 
This is in some contrast to traditional conceptions of finance, in 
which violent market interactions, the often destructive clash of the ra-
tional self-interests of market actors, were celebrated because these con-
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flicts supported growth, innovation, and hence new jobs. It has been said 
that financial volatility, creative destruction, and so forth are the hall-
marks of a dynamic, creative capitalism—a capitalism that is highly lo-
calized at the best of times. So the question arises—Will broader needs 
for a more stable, boring capitalism bring about Schumpeter’s prophecy 
of the bureaucratic end of entrepreneurial capitalism? 
8. Labor Markets and Social Capitalism 
As suggested above, a great deal of political economy rests upon 
the belief that capital formation leads to growth and that growth will re-
quire labor, leading to high rates of employment, and hence human well-
being. As also suggested, however, capital may not lead to growth, and 
even if it occurs, growth may employ relatively few people, to which it is 
often said that (still more) education is thus necessary. It is not at all 
clear that technological markets tend to employ many (code is infinitely 
replicable), and, as noted, surpluses imply deficits. Even if all workers 
could somehow be made competitive in technological economies, how-
ever, the fact remains that a humane political economy must account for 
many people who are not economically productive. In short, social capi-
talism appears not only to have transformed the opposition between labor 
and capital that was long an article of faith on the left, but it has also al-
most severed the relationship between labor and capital that has long 
served, for those on the right, as justification for capital’s antics and ine-
quality generally. What does this state of affairs mean for labor policy? 
What are the consequences for education policy? 
There is much more to say, but the foregoing ought to provide this 
conference with a few points of reference if not a tight focus and, at any 
rate, ought to be enough provocation for a Problematique. I trust that 
conference participants will not feel overly constrained by my effort to 
articulate these problems and will say what they wish. 
V. CONCLUSION: A VERY PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
So, does it work? Can a virtual “conference” be used to foster the 
emergence of new thinking about public policy and help elites to rethink 
their positions? 
“Rethinking Financial Markets” takes place after this writing. The 
work that has been done so far has been in preparation. Moreover, this 
conference serves as a sample. No doubt virtual conferences could be 
better designed. In short, it is far too soon to draw firm conclusions. 
It is not too soon, however, to make some preliminary assessments. 
As this journal goes to press, some two dozen papers have been submit-
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ted. The WEA has done a great deal of work planning and marketing this 
conference, and I think we have learned some things. 
Perhaps the most exciting aspect of the conference has been the 
sheer range of participants: scholars from not only Europe and North 
America, but also from South America, across Asia, and Australia, have 
submitted papers. 
In light of the fact that this is an open conference, accessible to an-
yone with Internet access, I have been pleasantly surprised by the quality 
of the papers. It may be that the Problematique discouraged frivolous 
responses. 
The electronic format has also encouraged, or at least allowed, a 
degree of experimentation. One contributor even wrote a (quite erudite) 
poem about the nature of political economy as it is seen at different 
times. This formal playfulness, again, may reflect the rather unconven-
tional framing of the Problematique—at least one contributor said so. 
As mentioned, in setting up this conference, the WEA both pub-
lished calls for papers and invited people directly. About half of the peo-
ple who have submitted papers are friends of mine, or at least friendly 
professional acquaintances. And many, many people who were invited 
have not had time, or have not made time, to write. 
A number of contributors were concerned that if they submitted a 
paper to the WEA, they would be foreclosed from publication elsewhere, 
which they wanted or perhaps even thought they needed for professional 
purposes. 
Drawing these impressions together, I am skeptical that such con-
ferences represent the sort of breakthrough that I perhaps naively hoped. 
I suspect that the motivations for elite conversations over the Internet are 
much the same as they ever were—chiefly, advancement and sociability. 
If that is the case, then conferences like “Rethinking Financial Markets” 
may do as much to reinforce the commitments of elite groupings as they 
do to foster new combinations and renewal. 
To close, for now, at the very least, “Rethinking Financial Markets” 
provides a large forum for interesting new work across vast distances. 
And the conference has not properly begun. It is much easier to comment 
on papers, and to comment on the comments, than it is to write. So we 
may yet hope for a sparkling dinner party. 
 
